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THE CULT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
RICHARD ALBERT?
ABSTRACT
 Constitutionalism compels and constrains all dimensions of our everyday lives in ways 
large and small that we often do not fully appreciate—perhaps because constitutions take 
many forms that we do not generally associate with constitutionalism. From the arts, sports, 
trade, entertainment, politics, and war, constitutionalism is both the point of departure and 
the port of call. In this Article, I explore whether and how we might distinguish among these 
seemingly infinite types of constitutions.  
 First, I critique conventional distinctions separating public from private constitutions, 
and international from national and local constitutions. Then, I build on that deconstruc-
tive exercise to propose a theory of constitutionalism that distinguishes between constitu-
tional basics and constitutional virtues. I subsequently undertake a comparative inquiry, 
applying this new model of constitutionalism to ask on what basis we might distinguish 
between a constitution of a nation from a constitution of a private organization.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
 Two years after America’s founding statesmen gathered in Phila-
delphia to write the United States Constitution, Benjamin Franklin 
paused to reflect on the charter that Americans had given themselves 
and bequeathed to their posterity: “Our new [C]onstitution is now 
established, and has an appearance that promises permanency; but 
in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and tax-
es!”1 Two centuries later, Franklin’s intuition about the permanence 
?  Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School; Yale University (J.D., B.A.); Ox-
ford University (B.C.L.); Harvard University (LL.M.). For helpful discussions and com-
ments on earlier outlines of this paper, I thank Vik Amar, Joel Colón-Ríos, Dustin Dow, 
Eric Allen Engle, Kent Greenfield, Susan Harris, Martín Hevia, Gordon Hylton, Rajeev 
Kadambi, K. Adam Kunst, Brian Quinn, Julie Sayre, Adam Shinar, Vinay Sitapati, Anna 
Su, Seth Tillman and Fred Yen. I am also pleased to thank Mina Ford, Sara Huff, Seth 
Welner, and their colleagues on The Florida State University Law Review for their terrific 
work in bringing this Article to print.  
 1.  Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 1
MEMOIRS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 619 (1834). 
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of the Constitution has proven right, so much so that we might now 
speak of death, taxes, and the United States Constitution as life’s 
three certainties. 
 The United States Constitution has defied the expectations that 
constitutional theorists commonly ascribe to national constitutions. 
Whereas many constitutions perish in the early years of nationhood, 
the United States Constitution has stood peerless in its durability: 
“[a]s it ages, it seems to grow stronger, and the risk of death re-
cedes.”2 Americans, beginning with the founding generation, have 
infused the constitutional text with an unassailable legitimacy, both 
moral and sociological. The document has survived turbulent periods 
of domestic conflict and foreign war, economic misfortune and indus-
trial growth, demographic evolution and migratory movement, and 
epic social and political transformations. But the endurance of the 
United States Constitution is just a small part of the larger story of 
constitutionalism that history will tell about our time. 
 Constitutionalism is ubiquitous. It informs how states behave in 
the international order, how governments treat their constituents, 
how communities order themselves, how groups relate to individuals, 
and how citizens interact with each other. Constitutionalism compels 
and constrains all dimensions of our everyday lives in ways large and 
small that we often do not fully appreciate, perhaps because constitu-
tions take many forms that we do not generally associate with consti-
tutionalism. Yet whether in the arts, sports, trade, entertainment, 
politics, or war, constitutionalism is both the point of departure and 
the port of call.  
 Consider the multiplicity of ways constitutionalism manifests it-
self around us. Return to the spring of 2010. In their battle to pass a 
new health care law expanding coverage for Americans, the Obama 
Administration and congressional Democrats resorted to the contro-
versial process of reconciliation to block a Republican filibuster that 
could have derailed the historic bill.3 Republicans responded that the 
legislative tactic of reconciliation was not only undemocratic but also 
unconstitutional.4 Democrats in turn countered that the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to make its own internal rules5—including rules 
like reconciliation, which congressional Republicans had themselves 
 2.  ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 65, 167 (2009). 
 3.  See Christi Parsons & Janet Hook, Obama Signs Reconciliation Bill with Major 
Student Loan Change, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/31/ 
nation/la-na-obama-reconciliation31-2010mar31. 
 4.  See Michael W. McConnell, Op-Ed, The House Health-Care Vote and the Constitu-
tion; No Bill Can Become Law Unless the Exact Same Text is Approved by a Majority of 
Both Houses of Congress, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704416904575121532877077328.html.
 5.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
2012]  THE CULT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 375
                 
deployed on many occasions in years past.6 A similar back-and-forth 
on war powers had earlier enveloped the Bush Administration’s 
choice in 2003 to enter Iraq by force: does the president’s authority as 
Commander-in-Chief7 trump the congressional power to declare war,8
and how were political actors to weigh the constitutional significance 
of the congressional resolution authorizing military force?9 Concerns 
about Iraqi sovereignty and American foreign policy interests arose 
against this larger backdrop of the constitutionality of the Iraq invasion. 
 Even less obvious instances of constitutionalism abound. For in-
stance, we have witnessed constitutionalism shape the resolution of 
trade disagreements between nations.10 In 2002, after decades of 
threatening to impose tariffs on Canadian lumber exports, the United 
States did just that, charging a 27% duty on Canadian softwood 
lumber for what the United States argued was an unfair Canadian 
governmental subsidy to its lumber industry.11 The dispute was ulti-
mately settled by an international tribunal according to the stric-
tures of the North American Free Trade Agreement, to which Canada 
and the United States are signatories.12
 We have also observed how constitutionalism governs relation-
ships in the university setting. In 2006, when the University of Colo-
rado at Boulder suspended Ward Churchill from its faculty, Churchill 
had within his portfolio of academic rights the power to appeal his 
dismissal.13 The appeal process entailed tolling limitations as well as 
manner and form requirements, all of which were dutifully cata-
logued in the University’s Faculty Senate Constitution and adminis-
tered by the Standing Committee on Privilege and Tenure.14
 6.  See ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30862, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION 
PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” (Mar. 20, 2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/ 
rpts/RL30862_20080320.pdf. 
 7.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 9.  See Neil A. Lewis, Congress Lets Slip the Dogs of War, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/13/weekinreview/the-world-congress-lets-slip-the-dogs-
of-war.html. 
 10.  For a discussion of the constitutionalization of the global economy, see DAVID 
SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES 
AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE (2008). 
 11.  Ian Austen & Clifford Krauss, U.S. Will Lift a Lumber Duty in a Trade Deal with 
Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at A6, available at 2006 WLNR 7141577. 
 12.  See Tobi Cohen, Canada’s Softwood Lumber Dispute with U.S. Laid to Rest, VAN-
COUVER SUN, July 23, 2010, at C2, available at 2010 WLNR 26170711; Brett Popplewell, 
NAFTA the Nasty No More; Twenty Years Ago, Free Trade Was Equated with National 
Suicide. How Things Change, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 7, 2009, at 02, available at 2009 
WLNR 2439522. 
 13.  See Dan Frosch, Colorado Regents Vote to Fire a Controversial Professor, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2007, at A11, available at 2007 WLNR 14191129. 
 14.  Scott Jaschik, The Ward Churchill Endgame, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (May 29, 
2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/05/29/churchill; UNIV. OF COLO-
RADO, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO FACULTY COUNCIL: FACULTY SENATE CONSTITUTION,
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 Constitutionalism pervades the world of sports just as emphatical-
ly as it does elsewhere. Case in point: We have seen constitutionalism 
at play in the World Cup of Soccer, and we have seen constitutional-
ism take center stage at the Olympics. When referee Koman Cou-
libaly drew the ire of the globe in the summer of 2010 for disallowing 
an American goal in the World Cup, angered fans and players turned 
immediately to the FIFA rulebook to investigate whether they had 
any recourse to reverse the controversial decision.15 Nearly a decade 
ago, at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, the judges awarded the 
gold medal in the figure skating pairs competition to the Russian 
team over the Canadian duo by a margin of five to four.16 When it 
later came to light that a French judge had cast the deciding vote 
under pressure to vote in favor of the Russians,17 Canada appealed 
the decision and demanded an independent investigation.18 The 
International Olympic Committee quickly took corrective action, but 
it could not alone undo the gold medal decision. To defuse the contro-
versy, the Committee needed to persuade the International Skating 
Union to find a way through the labyrinthine rules and procedures 
enshrined in its General Regulations.19 In the end, all parties agreed 
to a curious compromise: to award the Canadian pair a gold medal of 
its own.20
 What unites these examples of constitutionalism is their common 
lineage. The intellectual origins of the rules governing the Interna-
tional Skating Union are the same ones that sustain the FIFA rule-
book, the University of Colorado’s Faculty Senate Constitution, the 
NAFTA regulations, and the United States Constitution. They are 
also anchored in the same foundations that underpin the constitutive 
charters of the New York State Bar Association,21 Microsoft,22 Whole 
                                                                                                                  
available at https://www.cu.edu/facultycouncil/constitution/Constitution.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2012). 
 15.  See Jeffrey Marcus, Referees Talk in the Open, but Not About that One Call, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2010, at B10, available at 2010 WLNR 12601623. 
 16.  See Jeff Chu, Fun and Games, TIME (Feb. 18, 2002), http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,203634,00.html. 
 17.  See Wayne Coffey, IOC Won’t Rule Out Sharing Skate Prize, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 15, 2002, at 93, available at 2002 WLNR 13833972. 
 18.  See Christine Brennan, Scoring Scandal Knocks Skating Chief for a Loop, USA
TODAY, Feb. 13, 2002, at 03D, available at 2002 WLNR 4493620. 
 19.  See Mark Starr, And Justice for All, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 14, 2002, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2002/02/14/and-justice-for-all.html. 
 20.  See Kerry Lauerman, Make Olympic Skating Judges Accountable, SALON (Feb. 16, 
2002), http://dir.salon.com/news/sports/2002/02/16/fix_skating/index.html. 
 21.  Bylaws of the New York State Bar Association (May 2, 1877), http://www.nysba.org/ 
Content/NavigationMenu/AboutNYSBA/Bylaws/BylawsJanuary2012.pdf. 
 22.  Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Microsoft Corporation (Nov. 
24, 2009), http://www.microsoft.com/investor/CorporateGovernance/PoliciesAndGuidelines/ 
articlesincorp.aspx.  
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Foods,23 the Sierra Club,24 Coca-Cola,25 Japan,26 the Organization of 
American States,27 the League of Women Voters,28 the Urban League 
of Philadelphia,29 and the Arab League.30 Their shared ancestral bond 
is the written constitution.  
 Constitutionalism can of course exist without a written constitu-
tion.31 But the concept of constitutionalism has today evolved into an 
institution deeply rooted in its written nature. From the early legal 
codes of Mesopotamia to the Solonian Constitution, from the Hebrew 
Bible to the Qur’an, from the Magna Carta to the United States Con-
stitution and to the recent Kenyan Constitution,32 humanity has 
across the ages developed a profound reverence for textuality. Acces-
sible and touchable, the written form invites the reader to take hold 
of the text as her own and to engage with it in ways that outflank 
even the grandest ethereal ideas and spoken promises. The result is 
salutary—both for the project of building nationhood and for the 
challenge of entrenching public citizenship—because it constructs a 
collective identity and orients citizens toward their common inter-
est.33 But writtenness has brought along with it a cavernous hazard: 
the advent of the written constitution has spawned a culture of con-
stitutionalism that threatens to devolve into a cult of constitutional-
ism defined more by artifice than virtue. 
 My task in these pages is to endeavor to distill constitutionalism 
to its simplest essence. I am concerned primarily with a question that 
understandably continues to puzzle political theorists: What is a con-
stitution, and what is it for? I readily concede that definitively defin-
ing constitutionalism is an impossibly high ambition, most assuredly 
 23.  Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Mar. 
24, 2006), http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/company/pdfs/restatedarticlesincorporation.pdf. 
 24.  Bylaws & Standing Rules of the Sierra Club (Apr. 11, 1981), http://www.sierraclub.org/ 
policy/downloads/bylaws.pdf. 
 25.  Restated Certificate of Incorporation of The Coca-Cola Company (Sept. 15, 1993), 
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/investors/certification.html. 
 26.  NIHONKOKU KENP? [KENP?] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). 
 27.  Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_ 
of_American_States.htm. 
 28.  Bylaws of the League of Women Voters of the United States, art. II, § 1 (May 3-17, 
1984), http://www.lwv.org/content/bylaws-and-certificate-incorporation. 
 29.  By-Laws of the Urban League of Philadelphia (Sept. 30, 2009), 
www.urbanleaguephila.org/bylaws.pdf. 
 30.  Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 237. 
 31.  See ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 9 (2003). One might ask, though, what came first: 
written constitutions or constitutionalism? The answer is quite surely the latter.
 32.  CONSTITUTION (2010) (Kenya). 
 33.  In this classic study of American government, Thomas Paine described the Ameri-
can Constitution as the “political bible of the state,” as the ultimate source of authority 
both in perception and reality, and as the glue that brought together disparate persons to 
form a nation of citizens who would come to be known as Americans. 2 THOMAS PAINE,
Rights of Man, Part II. Combining Principles and Practice, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS PAINE 145, 180-81 (1856). 
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so within this limited context. Nonetheless, I hope to illuminate the 
subsidiary queries that we should raise in interrogating the larger, 
elusive question about what constitutes the core of a constitution.  
 I begin, in Part II, by examining constitutionalism and its forms. 
There, I posit a number of distinctions according to which we gener-
ally understand constitutions, and suggest that each of them risks 
collapsing under the weight of scrutiny. Part III builds on that 
deconstructive exercise to propose the beginnings of a positive theory 
of constitutionalism that may help us theorize both the basic form 
and function of constitutions, irrespective of their indigenous mani-
festations. In Part IV, I undertake a comparative inquiry, applying 
the model of constitutionalism constructed earlier in Part III to ask 
which is more constitution-like: the constitution of a nation, such as 
the United States Constitution, or the constitution of a private organ-
ization, for example the Constitution of the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association? The answer, I believe, is not as clear as we might 
suppose. Part V concludes with reflections on the interrelationship 
between constitutions and constitutionalism.
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS FORMS
 We cannot define constitutionalism without first understanding 
its constitutive features. But identifying the elements that comprise 
constitutionalism is easier said than done because there is no short-
age of conflicting theories about what constitutionalism is and what 
it demands. Still, if there is one incontrovertible point about constitu-
tionalism it is that it boasts a distinctive appeal, not only along prac-
tical and political lines, but also on moral and normative grounds. 
And therein lies the biggest conceptual problem underlying modern 
theories of constitutionalism: they collapse constitutionalism’s func-
tions—for example, its insistence on predictability, fair notice, and 
separating powers—with constitutionalism’s goods, namely its cele-
bration of the rule of the law and its eternal pursuit of societal cohe-
sion, unity, and fidelity to the community.  
A.   Conceptions of Constitutionalism 
 There are two major conceptions of constitutionalism. The first 
looks to its purpose. The second looks to its promise. These two con-
ceptions of constitutionalism are not necessarily incompatible; rather, 
they are cumulative. The second folds within itself some manifesta-
tion of the first, meaning that it presupposes, correctly, that constitu-
tionalism has a purpose, but it subsequently takes the further step of 
orienting itself toward constitutionalism’s higher promise for human-
ity. Let us call the first conception of constitutionalism functional 
constitutionalism, and the second aspirational constitutionalism.
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 For functional constitutionalism, constitutionalism is a simple 
matter of fact: Can we point to something recognizable as a constitu-
tion? It is a binary question, yes or no. Functional constitutionalism 
does not concern itself with the values or substantive principles that 
do or should appear in a constitution. On this view, a constitution is 
no more than a set of basic rules that define, describe, and govern the 
structure and operation of an entity.34 That entity may be a country, 
a country club, a subnational territory, an organization, a private in-
stitution, a football team, or even an individual. To write a constitu-
tion for that entity, a number of questions demand answers, includ-
ing some or all of the following: How is the entity structured? Are 
there conditions to joining the entity and to subsequently remain a 
member? Who may bind the entity and act in its name?35 The an-
swers to these questions form the rules that comprise the constitu-
tion and define the powers and undertakings of those who constitute 
that entity. They also serve as instructions for how the entity dis-
charges its mission and how it relates to the outside world.36
 What characterizes functional constitutionalism is a bold and un-
compromising—and for some perhaps a disconcerting—amorality 
about the role of a constitution. Functional constitutionalism pays no 
heed to questions of right and wrong, virtue or vice, just or unjust. It 
is “wholly neutral in moral and political terms,” and makes no judg-
ment as to whether a given constitution “is good or bad or about 
whether it is worth commending or condemning.”37 We may draw a 
useful parallel to procedural democracy, which Frank Michelman 
contrasts with substantive democracy. The former concerns questions 
about the decisionmaking process, namely who makes the laws and 
who interprets them, whereas the latter is more concerned with the 
actual content of those laws and the social purposes they serve.38 This 
view, however, is subject to John Hart Ely’s observation that proce-
dural democracy cannot function properly without baseline rules 
about political equality and representation,39 which may themselves 
be regarded as principles of substantive democracy. We can therefore 
refine the distinction in the interest of achieving greater clarity about 
functional constitutionalism: Procedural democracy demands an or-
der anchored in only those substantive concepts that make possible 
 34.  LEONARD JASON-LLOYD, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1996). 
 35.  CHERYL SAUNDERS, IT’S YOUR CONSTITUTION: GOVERNING AUSTRALIA TODAY 1 (2d 
ed. 2003). 
 36.  HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (5th ed. 2004). 
 37.  ANTHONY KING, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 3 (2007). 
 38.  Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 401-02,
411 (1998). 
 39.  This is what John Hart Ely refers to as “the representation-reinforcing approach.” 
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-
104 (1980). 
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fair procedures; in contrast, functional constitutionalism is interested 
only in having an order irrespective of its content. Functional consti-
tutionalism, then, is quite simply a positivist conception of a blue-
print that designs structures to preside over a group of persons and 
to command a course of conduct consistent with the group’s purpose, 
whether mal-intentioned or righteous. 
 Functional constitutionalism therefore regards a constitution as a 
blank slate. Beyond its minimal elements of structure and design, a 
constitution is an empty cast devoid of intrinsic moral, ideological, or 
political meaning. No fill is poured into the shell to give it a prede-
termined shape; the cast of the constitution is not sculpted by an in-
trinsic fundamental purpose nor is it reinforced by higher theoretical 
principles. It is better seen as a clean canvas unmarked even by the 
first strokes of paint. It will display whatever portrait is affixed to it 
and take the shape into which it is molded by its artisans.  
 Malleability, impressionability, and manipulability—those are the 
defining characteristics of a constitution according to the functional 
conception of constitutionalism. It stands ready to be deployed for 
any purpose ascribed to it. For the constitution of the newly inde-
pendent state of Kosovo,40 the purpose may be to establish a repre-
sentative government. For the constitution of the Rotary Club of 
Montebello,41 the purpose may be to congregate in the service of 
community-building activities and personal enrichment exercises. 
For the Sicilian mafia’s constitution,42 the purpose may be to earn 
illicit profits for distribution along the chain of command in a pre-
scribed order of priority. Functional constitutionalism sees these 
purposes as equally valid and consequently perceives no difference 
among the constitutions of Kosovo, the Rotary Club, and the mafia. 
 But aspirational constitutionalism sets a higher standard for a 
constitution. It looks askance at the concept of functional constitu-
tionalism, convinced not only that amorality is the very reverse of 
what should structure communities, but moreover that the bare-
boned approach of functional constitutionalism is an uninspiring way 
to understand both a constitution and its wider social purposes. Aspi-
rational constitutionalism does not limit itself to the ways in which a 
community is presently arranged, constrained as it may be by the 
practical realities of finite resources, internal limitations, and a 
narrow imagination of possibilities for collective and individual 
growth. Aspirational constitutionalism, instead, sees a constitution 
as reflecting a vision of society as it could be; it decrees a collabora-
tive undertaking for the community to pursue. Though it may be an 
 40.  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO pmbl. (2008). 
 41.  Constitution of the Rotary Club of Montebello, California, art. IV, available at
http://www.montebellorotaryclub.org/docs/rotaryconstitution.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).  
 42.  See JOHN DICKIE, COSA NOSTRA: A HISTORY OF THE SICILIAN MAFIA (2004). 
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eternally unachievable objective, this vision of constitutionalism sets 
out to perfect the political and institutional arrangements that 
constitute communities. Aspirational constitutionalism therefore 
brandishes as its sword the Austinian philosophy that a constitution 
is the embodiment of positive morality.43 It assigns substantive 
meaning to the project of constitutionalism, defines it as more than 
merely specifying the “rules of the game,”44 and seeks to breathe into 
it values coherent with the larger project of liberal democracy.  
 More than purely a set of operating procedures, an aspirational 
constitution is more precisely a standard that merges principles of 
governance, institutional expectations, and some form of an ethical 
code.45 What underpins this view of constitutionalism is that persons 
who join forces to create a constitutional community will have the 
capacity and willingness to suspend their personal interests in the 
service of the larger good. That is what liberal democracy demands: 
respect for the rule of law and the predictability, notice, and fairness 
that constitute it. Aspirational constitutionalism insists on subordi-
nating one’s immediate, inward-looking desires to the longer-term, 
public-regarding interests of the whole. In this respect, aspirational 
constitutionalism exemplifies the struggle for righteousness, the 
search for completion, and the march toward an idealized version of 
reality. It is, as one text puts it, “an ideal that may be more or less 
approximated by different types of constitutions and that is built on 
certain prescriptions and certain proscriptions.”46
 Importantly, though, those prescriptions and proscriptions can be 
assessed only against a normative standard. But choosing that 
standard is problematic. David Strauss states the problem in this 
way: “[I]t presupposes some form of moral objectivity. That is, it pre-
supposes that in a wide range of cases, there are right and wrong an-
swers to moral questions. Otherwise, it would not be possible to say 
that certain rights are fundamental, and that all societies should pro-
tect them.”47 And therein lies the insoluble haze of aspirational con-
stitutionalism. Giving content to that normative standard requires 
reaching some peaceful and plausible agreement among disparate 
peoples whose view of the world is informed by their own particular-
ized lived experiences. This may be possible in homogeneous commu-
nities bound together by a shared history and a common code of 
communal ethics that predates constitutionalism. But, it is much 
 43.  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 53, 71 (2d ed. 1861). 
 44.  Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITU-
TION IN 2020, at 25, 26 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
 45.  GILLIAN PEELE, GOVERNING THE UK: BRITISH POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
32-33 (2004). 
 46.  NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRÁS SAJÓ & SUSANNE BAER, COMPAR-
ATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (2003). 
 47.  David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 558 (1992). 
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harder in heterogeneous communities that do not rest on these tan-
gible connections and rely instead on constitutionalism as a condition 
of membership. Nonetheless, we have seen constitutionalism create 
several inventive devices to facilitate agreement among dissimilar 
individuals. Federalism is perhaps the best illustration of a constitu-
tional innovation that has been deployed to manage differences in a 
polity and to palliate the problem of moral subjectivity.48
 Despite its difficulty, managing difference and negotiating com-
promise may be the most compelling attraction of aspirational consti-
tutionalism. Few things can be more satisfying than joining together 
with others to fashion a sustainable accord about how to improve 
ourselves and our community. And to do so by engaging in civil 
debate, heated though it may become, about the course to chart to-
ward better prospects for the union, association, or country—that is 
what opens the door to constitutionalism’s majestic possibilities for 
fulfilling the maxim that humanity can sometimes achieve unimag-
inable triumphs unbefitting the sum of its parts. Yet aspirational 
constitutionalism’s appeal may also be the greatest threat to itself. 
 Paradoxically, it is precisely that which makes constitutionalism 
so appealing that complicates the task of defining constitutionalism. 
True, constitutionalism is at its best when it takes root in tandem 
with the rule of law as its foundation. But it is inaccurate to define 
constitutionalism in terms of the rule of law, as if the former insists 
on the latter or the latter requires the former. That may be more of a 
wish than a reality because constitutionalism and the rule of law can, 
and indeed do, exist independent of each other.  
 Take North Korea and Iran, for example. Both are oppressive re-
gimes whose people are deprived of the blessings of liberty and the 
pleasures of peace and prosperity despite being ostensibly governed 
by supreme constitutions which purportedly guarantee democratic 
rights and freedoms.49 What these authoritarian states demonstrate 
in plain view is that constitutions are sometimes deployed as a 
smokescreen by nefarious persons with nefarious purposes—which is 
nothing new because constitutions have long existed in states that 
have no culture of constitutionalism.50 Let us therefore not be held 
 48.  Michael Burgess, Managing Diversity in Federal States: Conceptual Lenses and 
Comparative Perspectives, in CONTEMPORARY CANADIAN FEDERALISM: FOUNDATIONS, TRA-
DITIONS, INSTITUTIONS 428, 428-40 (Alain-G. Gagnon ed., 2009); see also RUSSELL HARDIN,
LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1999) (rethinking constitutional com-
mitments in terms of social coordination and game theory instead of the conventional nar-
rative of mutual benefit and cooperation). 
 49.  CONSTITUTION OF N. KOR., ch. V, art. 64 (2009); ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA
TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 3(7), 1368 
[1989] (Iran). 
 50.  See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections 
on an African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN 
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spellbound by the illusion that the rule of law derives from constitu-
tionalism, or that the two travel together. That is only one miscon-
ception about constitutionalism. There are others. Other false posi-
tives pepper the terrain of constitutionalism—and we must press 
those unsteady distinctions before proceeding to theorize constitu-
tionalism afresh. 
B.   Illusory Distinctions 
 Constitutions come in many manifestations. The World Trade Or-
ganization,51 Google,52 the American Association of University Profes-
sors,53 the Commonwealth of Australia,54 the Republic of Haiti,55 the 
Ford Foundation,56 the College Republicans of the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology,57 General Motors,58 and Disney59—all of these 
entities govern their internal and external relations with reference to 
a constitution. Like the other associations and institutions that dot 
the landscape of human organization, these are groups large and 
small, far and near, professional and academic, profit-making and 
service-oriented, and everything in between. This limitless collection 
of constitutions calls for manageable categories to structure our un-
derstanding of the infinite possibilities of constitutionalism.  
 Two obvious distinctions emerge as promising prospects for sort-
ing constitutions. The first concerns the sphere of the constitutional 
order and the second concerns its reach. On the former, we could pos-
it a distinction between public and private constitutions. As to the 
latter, we could hypothesize that international constitutions are dif-
ferent from national ones, which are themselves different from sub-
national ones. Using these points of dissimilarity, we could suggest 
the following archetypes of constitutional kind: (1) a public interna-
                                                                                                                  
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 65-82 (Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth 
Oliviero & Steven C. Wheatley eds. 1993). 
 51.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 52.  Third Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Google Inc. (Aug. 24, 
2004), http://investor.google.com/corporate/certificate-of-incorporation.html. 
 53.  Constitution of the American Association of University Professors (June 13, 2009), 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/bus/constitution.htm. 
 54.  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900 (Imp), 63 & 64 Victoria, c. 
12 § 9 (U.K.). 
 55.  La Constitution de la République d’Haïti de 1987 [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 28, 1987 (Haiti). 
 56.  Restated Articles of Incorporation of the Ford Foundation (Dec. 8, 1983), 
http://www.fordfound.org/pdfs/about/Charter_Articles_of_Incorp.pdf. 
 57.  Constitution of the MIT College Republicans (May 8, 1995), http:/web.mit.edu/ 
republicans/www/constitution.html. 
 58.  Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of General Motors Holding 
Company (Aug. 11, 2009), http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/ 
EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHtmlSection1?SectionID=6895833-837814-851247&SessionID= 
UPPIHFqxm7zmKG7. 
 59.  Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Walt Disney Company (July 9, 1999), 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/media/corporate/DisneyCertificateofIncorporation.pdf. 
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tional constitution, for instance the United Nations Charter;60 (2) a 
public national constitution, namely the Irish Constitution;61 (3) a 
public subnational constitution, for example the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts;62 (4) a private international consti-
tution, such as the Constitution of the International Association of 
Lions Clubs;63 (5) a private national constitution, like the Charter of 
the National Rifle Association of the United Kingdom;64 and (6) a pri-
vate subnational constitution, perhaps the Constitution of the Texas 
Ornithological Society.65 We could hypothesize that these categories 
bring clarity to constitutional forms. But we would find these catego-
ries unsatisfactory because there are negligible differences between 
public and private constitutions, and among international, national, 
and subnational ones. 
 Begin first with what may be an illusory distinction between a 
public and a private constitution. Consider the case of a private asso-
ciation governed by a private constitution. Assume that the private 
association has adopted the practice of holding association-wide elec-
tions at each election cycle in order to select candidates who will then 
run in a number of different races for the official Democratic nomina-
tion. Further assume that this private association prohibits a certain 
class of citizens from participating in its private elections. Those 
were the facts in a case before the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in which the Court elaborated what has come to be known as 
the state action doctrine.66 The doctrine generally holds that the 
United States Constitution’s protections for civil rights and liberties 
apply only to public, or governmental, institutions.67
 But there are exceptions to the state action doctrine. The most 
relevant one for our purposes is the public function exception, which 
holds that the Constitution applies where a private entity performs a 
task or engages in conduct that was traditionally and exclusively per-
formed by a public body.68 Returning to our example of a private as-
sociation holding association-wide elections, the Court concluded that 
the administration of elections is a traditional government task—a 
task which private associations may assist in administering but not 
 60.  U.N. Charter. 
 61.  IR. CONST., 1937. 
 62.  MASS. CONST.
 63.  Constitution and By-Laws of the International Association of Lions Clubs (revised 
July 8, 2011), http://www.lionsclubs.org/EN/common/pdfs/la1.pdf. 
 64.  Charter of the National Rifle Association of the United Kingdom (Nov. 25, 1954), 
http://www.nra.org.uk/common/files/currentcharter.pdf. 
 65.  Texas Ornithological Society Constitution (revised, 1998), http://www.texasbirds.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80:constitution&catid=61:documents& 
Itemid=89. 
 66.  See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
 67.  See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-19 (1883). 
 68.  See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
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in a way that circumvents the strictures of the public constitution.69
The same theory has compelled the Court to rule similarly in other 
instances. For example, where a town was fully owned by a private 
corporation, it was nevertheless a public town and therefore subject 
to the standards that govern public entities.70 Another example: a 
private, racially restrictive covenant was denied the cover of judicial 
enforcement because giving public refuge to such private conduct 
would be to sanction discrimination.71 Still another example: Ameri-
can corporations must conform their conduct to the standards of the 
United States Constitution,72 but they may also claim the benefits it 
confers.73 What these cases have in common is their underlying theo-
ry, which is that the state is implicated in all forms of conduct by 
even nonstate actors because “any private action acquiesced in by the 
state can be seen to derive its power from the state . . . .”74
 At first glance, it may seem plausible to state that there exist 
meaningful points of contrast between the constitutions that compel 
and limit the actions of public bodies and private associations. In-
deed, Carl Schmitt, one of history’s most influential constitutional 
theorists, has suggested that very point, reasoning that “[a] proper 
understanding requires that the meaning of the term ‘constitution’ be 
limited to the constitution of the state, that is to say, the political uni-
ty of the people.”75 A constitution, to him, may only correctly refer to 
the organizing principles of a public body, not a private one, which 
must necessarily mean that public charters differ in material re-
spects from their private counterparts. There is some truth to that. 
The former focuses on government institutions while the latter con-
strains only nongovernmental bodies. Yet as we see from our case 
study of elections, that cursory analysis, while descriptively accurate 
as a factual statement, cannot hold when pressed beyond its surface. 
Private associations and public bodies do not operate in separate 
spheres; they coexist in the same single sphere and are often held to 
the same standard of conduct. An artificial distinction between public 
and private constitutions is therefore appealing but misleading. For 
it fails to appreciate the multiple methods and mechanisms that have 
shrunk the space between the public and private spheres, so much so 
that it makes little sense to insist on such a contrived distinction be-
tween public and private. 
 69.  Terry, 345 U.S. at 468-69. 
 70.  See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 71.  See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 72.  See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
 73.  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912-13 (2010); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419, 428-29 (1963). 
 74.  Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. 
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1982).
 75.  CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 59 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed., trans., 2008). 
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 If there is a difference between public and private, it may be more 
conceptual than empirical. That is one of the enduring contributions 
of Duncan Kennedy’s vast body of influential scholarship: it is not 
possible, he wrote, “to take the public/private distinction seriously as 
a description, as an explanation, or as a justification of anything.”76
Claire Culter has written similarly in the context of public and pri-
vate international law, observing that “the distinction is in empirical 
decline as forces of globalization and privatization are blurring the 
separation between private and public authority.”77 But even the con-
ceptual distinction raises challenging questions about how to classify 
something as private or public. Charter schools, business improve-
ment districts, government contractors, homeowners’ associations78—
these now customary coalitions of traditional public and private in-
stitutions illustrate the difficulty of articulating with convincing 
clarity the bases upon which something may be said to fall within or 
beyond the realm of the private. 
 There may also be a second illusory distinction among constitu-
tions: international versus national versus local. There is no longer 
such a thing as a border between states and, if there is, it no longer 
means what it once did. Borders have faded, though not quite 
vanished—our inheritance from the politics of the twentieth century. 
Once upon a time, ages ago it seems, what characterized membership 
in the international order of states was a reciprocal distrust and a 
jealous security of national borders. This defensive posture was 
obligatory if states were to preserve the twin signposts of statehood: 
territorial sovereignty and political independence. States consequent-
ly devised an effective instrument in the service of self-
determination: the principle of nonintervention. Long established, 
the principle affirms that no state may intervene in the internal af-
fairs of any other, be they cultural, economic, political, or social.  
 Nonintervention was then, and remains today, anchored in the 
theory of deterrence. Where two states enter into a nonintervention 
agreement, each knows that the other reserves the right to intervene 
in the internal affairs of the other if one of the two parties violates 
the agreement. The most commonly feared manifestation of interven-
tion is any form of military intercession, though political or economic 
aggression may be equally devastating to the viability of a state. In 
the interest of preserving its own territorial sovereignty and political 
independence, a state will agree to a pact of nonintervention out of 
 76.  Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1982). 
 77.  A. Claire Cutler, Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in 
International Law, 4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 261, 261-62 (1997). 
 78.  Paul M. Schoenhard, A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinc-
tion, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 635, 642. 
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fear of losing dominion over its land and people. This once central 
principle of nonintervention dates to a series of seventeenth-century 
agreements among royal emperors.79 Mutually suspicious of the 
designs of monarchs on their holdings, the ruling classes negotiated 
this mutual deterrent of nonintervention.80 Nonintervention embod-
ied the core foreign policy that informed all international relation-
ships through the early years of the Post Second World War Era.81
The principle even became constitutionalized in several nations82 and 
elevated as a condition for membership to international bodies, most 
notably the United Nations,83 the Organization of American States,84
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.85
 In recent years, however, nonintervention has fallen out of style. 
Although the principle of nonintervention has not officially been ab-
rogated from constitutions or international charters, it has lost the 
force it once enjoyed. Consider the recent military interventions in 
Darfur,86 Liberia,87 and Georgia.88 What those episodes illustrate is 
that gone are the days of regarding states as islands, as unconnected 
entities whose internal affairs are of no concern to the wider world. It 
is difficult to consider this development a surprise given the gradual 
disappearance of borders that have traditionally demarcated nations 
and the expanding sphere of influence enjoyed by the world’s econom-
ic and military powers.  
 The escalating pace of globalization is not the only reason why the 
principle of nonintervention has been cast aside as an artifact of an 
earlier political order. Another terribly important reason is the rise of 
what Bruce Ackerman calls “world constitutionalism,”89 the notion 
that humanity is converging toward a set of shared understandings 
about the role of the state and the rights of citizens—a descriptive, 
not normative, vision of the world that is encapsulated emphatically 
 79.  ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND 
ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 1-14 (1956). 
 80.  Id.
 81.  See JUDE IBEGBU, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171-72 (1999). 
 82.  See, e.g., CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE ALGÉRIENNE DÉMOCRATIQUE ET POPU-
LAIRE [CONSTITUTION] 1996, pt. I, ch. III, art. 28 (Alg.); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE RE-
PUBLIC OF ANGOLA Aug. 1992, pt. I, art. 15; CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
BANGLADESH Nov. 4, 1972, pt. II, art. 25(1). 
 83.  U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7. 
 84.  Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 27, at art. 19. 
 85.  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, pmbl. 
 86.  See Lydia Polgreen, Peacekeeping in Darfur Hits More Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
24, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 5627702. 
 87.  See Somini Sengupta, Peacekeeping Unit Arrives in Liberia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2003, at A1, available at 2003 WLNR 5653424. 
 88.  See Neil MacFarquhar & Thom Shanker, Russian Neighbors Urge U.N. to Stand 
Against Kremlin Aggression, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at A10, available at 2008 
WLNR 18186747. 
 89.  Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997). 
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in such texts as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,90 the 
European Convention,91 the Charter of the African Union,92 the North 
Atlantic Treaty,93 and elsewhere. These international constitutions 
have very serious implications for national constitutions. For exam-
ple, international constitutions, some of which are also known as 
treaties, are often given a higher authority than national rules.94 As a 
consequence, national rules fall below, and therefore are subject to, 
international rules, the effect of which is to fuse international consti-
tutional standards into domestic ones.95
 Perhaps the best example is the Constitution of South Africa, 
which compels domestic judicial bodies to interpret the South African 
Bill of Rights in a manner that respects international law.96 The im-
petus for inserting this provision in the South African Constitution 
was to begin to right the wrongs of the past. When South Africa 
emerged from the darkness of institutionalized inequality to give it-
self a new constitution in 1996, the constitutional designers wanted 
to send a signal to the world: the new South Africa would be guided 
by international human rights norms.97 The result was to reshape 
South Africa in the image of the wider world. Humanity’s standards 
for rights and state conduct would become those of the government 
and people of South Africa; in so doing, they would challenge the con-
ventional distinction between national and international. 
 In much the same way, the distinction between national and local 
is deceptive. Consider federal states in which there are two levels of 
government: national and subnational. A number of these states pos-
sess both a national and several subnational constitutions. For in-
stance, the United States and Argentina98 both have a national con-
stitution and subnational constitutions, the former being state con-
 90.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 91.  Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 92.  Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 93.  North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 94.  See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 [CON-
STITUTION] Nov. 7, 1949, tit. VIII, ch. III, arts. 99-104; tit. IX; tit. X; tit. XI; tit. XIII, ch. II, 
arts. 183-84 (Costa Rica); U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  
 95.  For a useful discussion of the internalization of constitutional law, see Ignacio de 
la Rasilla del Moral, The Unsolved Riddle of International Constitutionalism, 12 INT’L
COMMUNITY L. REV. 81 (2010). We find an equally useful analysis in Ulen and Ginsburg’s 
recent work, in which they argue that the fusion of the international into the national 
serves important political interests: “[I]t not only facilitates commitment to international 
audiences, but also to domestic ones. That is, politicians may in some circumstances choose 
to convey promises to domestic constituents in international instruments rather than in 
domestic ones.” Tom Ginsburg & Thomas S. Ulen, Odious Debt, Odious Credit, Economic 
Development, and Democratization, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 124 (2007). 
 96.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 39(1)(b). 
 97.  JOAN CHURCH, CHRISTIAN SCHULZE & HENNIE STRYDOM, HUMAN RIGHTS FROM A 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 195 (2007). 
 98.  CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.). 
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stitutions99 and the latter provincial ones.100 It would be incorrect to 
presume that these constitutions are intended by their textual provi-
sions to constrain only the actions of their respective levels of gov-
ernment. Quite the contrary, the Argentinian Constitution makes the 
provincial governors “agents” of the federal government for a specific 
purpose: “the enforcement of the Constitution and the laws of the 
Nation.”101 Moreover, although the provincial governments may 
create their own constitutions, they must do so “in accordance with 
the principles, declarations, and guarantees of the National Constitu-
tion.”102 The effect is to fuse the national into the local. 
 The United States Constitution does something similar. The Con-
stitution provides in the Supremacy Clause that it not only takes 
precedence over the subnational constitutions of the several states 
but that its text governs in the event of a conflict with the constitu-
tions, laws, or actions of the subnational entities.103 Likewise, the 
standard set by the United States Bill of Rights is also fused into the 
constitutional law of the states, a result of the incorporation doc-
trine,104 which now requires states to comply with many of the political 
and civil rights enshrined in the national Bill of Rights.105 Thus the 
local becomes the national, undermining the claim that meaningful 
differences flow from the national or subnational character of a con-
stitutional text. That renders this distinction as insecure as the one 
between international and national or public and private.  
III.   CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES
 Perhaps instead of categorizing constitutions according to their 
zone of application and territorial reach, we might alternatively clas-
sify constitutional types according to their constituent components. 
There are certain tasks, functions, or features that define constitution-
alism as a fundamental enterprise. These are baseline criteria that 
must be present in order to constitute a constitution. We can call these 
constitutional basics—features that are indispensable to a constitu-
tion, without which something is unidentifiable as a constitution. 
Constitutional basics set the floor for the minimum attributes of con-
stitutionalism; all constitutions must and do, as a descriptive matter, 
satisfy those requirements. But beyond these constitutional basics, a 
constitution should also possess features and perform tasks or func-
tions that are neither necessary nor sufficient for constitutionalism 
 99.  See, e.g., ALASKA CONST.; S.C. CONST.; TENN. CONST.
 100.  See, e.g., BUENOS AIRES CONST.; SANTA FE CONST.; MENDOZA CONST.
 101.  Art. 128, CONST. NAC. (Arg.). 
 102.  Id. at art. 5. 
 103.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 104.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 105. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968). 
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but that are nevertheless worthy ambitions for a constitution. We can 
call this second class of normative constitutional characteristics con-
stitutional virtues—features that constitutions should aspire to ex-
hibit because they are desirable elements of constitutionalism. 
A.   Constitutional Basics 
 All constitutions do three things. First, constitutions separate 
powers by creating an internal structure of authority that serves as a 
referent for disputes. Second, constitutions identify or create a 
class of constituents who must govern themselves according to it. 
Third, constitutions embrace a purpose or a mission that guides con-
stituents and their governors in the conduct of their affairs, both 
internal to the group and external toward the wider world. But con-
stitutions can do each of these three things without expressly stating 
so in their text.  
 Take the separation of powers as an example. Some national con-
stitutions make plain by their very words that the separation of pow-
ers is a fundamental organizing principle of governance.106 For exam-
ple, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
actually declares that a state without the separation of powers has no 
constitution at all.107 The same cannot be said about the United 
States Constitution, which was nevertheless constructed on the basis 
of Montesquieu’s separation of powers theory.108 Although the Ameri-
can presidential system has become synonymous with separated 
powers,109 nowhere in the text of the United States Constitution will 
one find a provision declaring explicitly that national powers shall 
operate separately. Instead, readers must infer the principle of sepa-
rated powers from the structure of the text and the substance of its 
several provisions, which establish independent legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches of government.110
 Constitutions do not separate powers for the sake of separation 
alone. They separate powers for a particular purpose: to establish a way, 
at least nominally, to resolve internal conflict. John Rogers discusses 
 106.  See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1945); AZER. CONST. art. 7(III); Article 47, Sec-
tion 3, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005; 
QATAR CONST., art. 60.  
 107.  Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen du 26 août 1789 [The Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26, 1789], Ministère de la Justice et de 
Libertés [Department of Justice and Freedom], Aug. 26, 1789, art. 16. 
 108.  See JACK P. GREENE, THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 
43-44 (1986). 
 109.  See Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor 
Ackerman is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51,
54-55 (2001); Fred W. Riggs, Globalization, Ethnic Diversity, and Nationalism: The Chal-
lenge for Democracies, 581 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 35, 42 (2002).
 110.  U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. 
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this point in the particular context of a state constitution, but he 
frames the dispute-resolving function of a constitution quite effectively, 
allowing us to extrapolate its application to nonstate constitutions: 
[W]e can think of a constitution as a kind of fundamental political 
agreement. The elements of a political society that hold power 
agree that decisions will be made in a certain way, by certain 
officials, institutions, or bodies. The terms of the agreement may 
be written or not. The agreement may be changed by express or 
implicit agreement. The agreement may be abolished or supersed-
ed by express or implicit agreement. Moreover, the agreement 
may be violated, even repeatedly. But as long as such an agree-
ment serves as a fundamental referent for disputes among the el-
ements that have power in the political society, one can speak of it 
as a constitution.111
Whether they structure the organization of governments or member-
ship associations or other groups, constitutions divide authority be-
tween or among entities with a view to elevating one above the others 
in some or all areas of potential dispute.  
 This is a compound point that demands two showings: first, that 
constitutions separate powers; and second, that their structure of 
separated powers serve as a referent for disputes. Both items are 
demonstrable in tandem. For instance, the Alabama Constitution 
creates three branches of government, separates responsibilities 
among them, and grants each primary jurisdiction in their respective 
spheres of authority.112 For its part, the Constitution of India creates 
and separates powers among four government departments and 
likewise authorizes each to exercise its powers to the fullest extent 
subject to conformity with the constitution.113 Likewise, the nonprofit 
Honeynet Project’s Constitution confers powers upon a board of di-
rectors, a corps of officers and committees, and also describes the 
terms for voting membership, all of which establish the conditions for 
exercising authority in the name of the body and resolving disputes 
that may arise in the normal or exceptional course of affairs.114
 Even a society that we might otherwise regard as dictatorial 
meets this first condition of constitutionalism. Hobbes’ classic study 
of political theory, Leviathan, depicts a community whose members 
have in common cause voluntarily surrendered their individual 
rights to one person or a group of persons—the sovereign—in the 
larger interest of the community.115 The sovereign therefore has the 
 111.  John M. Rogers, Anticipating Hong Kong’s Constitution from a U.S. Legal Perspective,
30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 449, 451 (1997). 
 112.  ALA. CONST. art. III, § 43 (1901). 
 113.  INDIA CONST. art. 53. 
 114.  See Bylaws and Constitution of The Honeynet Project, arts. 4-6 (July 10, 2007), 
http://old.honeynet.org/misc/files/20070723-bylaws.pdf. 
 115.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.C.A. GASKIN ed., reissue ed. 2009) (1651). 
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power to make rules, may judge the application of its own rules, and 
is immune to challenges to its authority by the membership.116 That 
is a separation of powers between ruler and ruled, a binary division 
of authority between two parties, one of which has forfeited the 
entirety of its rights to the other. Normatively, we may find some 
discomfort in this arrangement. But as a descriptive matter, it fulfills 
the first of three constitutional basics: separating powers as a ref-
erent for disputes.  
 Constitutions are not self-executing directives. They require activ-
ity, interpretation, enforcement, and adherence by persons—which 
leads us to the second condition of constitutionalism: membership. A 
constitution creates, or by its very being embodies, the body or group 
of constituents who are bound to govern themselves within the con-
fines of the arrangement of rules, orders, customs, conventions, and 
practices the constitution establishes and whose growth the constitu-
tion facilitates. A constitution, therefore, defines the boundaries of 
membership for the constitutional community, either in precise terms 
or implicitly in noncontroversially pliable ones.117 This may seem an 
obvious point; of course a constitution must refer to a body of persons 
otherwise it would not actually constitute anything meaningful.118
But the point is a critical one if we look beyond the constitution of a 
state and recognize that constitutionalism takes many forms around 
us. For example, although a publicly-traded corporation traces its 
permission to operate to a public charter granted by its incorporating 
state jurisdiction, its relevant membership is not the larger polity but 
rather the corporation’s individual shareholders. Similarly, the 
constitution of the Atlantic Coast Conference, an intercollegiate 
sports association, serves its member institutions, not the fans that 
fill the bleachers when their alma mater plays a game on that confer-
ence schedule. And even a dictatorship has a membership, though it 
may admittedly not be a willing one.  
 One final feature is common to constitutions irrespective of their 
form, structure, length, scope, or reach: constitutions orient them-
selves toward a purpose or mission. The purpose or mission assuredly 
varies from one constitution to the next. It may be a forward-looking, 
positive, community-building mission, or it may be an insular, de-
structive, hate-filled mission, or it may be something else altogether. 
But the shared similarity among constitutions is that they convey, 
either expressly or by inference, an objective that guides the constitu-
tional community both as an entity and as individual participants (or 
subjects) in the collective venture they have undertaken or to which 
 116.  See id. at 115-22. 
 117.  Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 576 (1998). 
 118.  See DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 299-302 (1996). 
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they have been compelled to submit. This third feature of constitu-
tionalism is evident in the Iranian Constitution, a document whose 
mission—to create a society on the basis of Islamic principles and 
norms—is deliberately, though not necessarily sincerely, articulated 
in its preambular statements.119
 We may also identify a constitutional purpose or mission in some 
of the earliest state constitutional texts, namely the Magna Carta, 
whose stated purpose was to protect the liberties of free persons,120
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 
written to secure for humanity the happiness it merited.121 We may 
also identify a stated purpose in the constitutions of the National 
Football League,122 Greenpeace,123 Exxon Mobil,124 the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,125 and the Delaware State Bar 
Association.126 Insofar as constitutional missions are intended to color 
the entire constitutional framework, they will consequently often ap-
pear in an introductory statement that casts a broad sweep of the 
entity’s possibilities. Sometimes constitutional missions will appear 
elsewhere deep in the text. Still other times, constitutional missions 
may not appear in print at all; we may instead need to infer the 
objective from the structure and substance of the constitution.  
B.   Constitutional Virtues 
 Constitutions, therefore, at a minimum, govern members of a 
community according to a structure of separated powers marshaled 
in the service of some identifiable objective. That is the most basic 
purpose of constitutionalism, something that we can analogize to the 
least common denominator among constitutions no matter the form 
they take. But these three fundamental elements of constitutionalism 
make for a horribly uninspiring portrait of constitutionalism. The 
constitutional basics are only structures devoid of moral content. Ill-
meaning rogues may therefore hijack constitutionalism for wicked 
 119.  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC RE-
PUBLIC OF IRAN] pmbl., 1358 [1980]. 
 120.  Magna Carta, 1297, 25 Edw. 1, cl. 1 (Eng.). 
 121.  Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen du 26 août 1789 [The Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26, 1789], Ministère de la Justice et de 
Libertés [Department of Justice and Freedom], Aug. 26, 1789, pmbl. 
 122.  Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League, art. II (Feb. 1, 1970), 
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf. 
 123.  Amended and Restated Bylaws of Greenpeace, Inc., art. VIII, § 8.1 (Feb, 23, 1990), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/binaries/2010/4/greenpeace-fund-inc-bylaws.pdf. 
 124.  Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Exxon Mobil Corporation, para. III (1-4) (June 
20, 2001), http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/investor_governance_incorporation.aspx. 
 125.  Articles of Incorporation of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 
para. V (Oct. 27, 1970), http://www.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7Bb0386ce3-8b29-4162-8098-
e466fb856794%7D/ARTICLES.PDF. 
 126.  Amended and Restated Delaware State Bar Association Bylaws, art. I.2 (Mar. 12, 
2007), www.dsba.org/pdfs/CommercialByLaws.pdf. 
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and deceitful purposes, soiling the larger promise of constitutional-
ism—a grander, nobler, and indeed much more righteous promise 
than its narrow and shockingly amoral purpose. This is precisely why 
constitutions should strive to embody lofty constitutional virtues be-
yond those simple constitutional basics. 
 What makes constitutionalism virtuous? There are several consti-
tutional virtues, but four in particular are noteworthy. First, a con-
stitution should be in written form to the extent possible. Second, a 
constitution should grant privileges and protections to its members 
as well as to its non-members. Third, a constitution should make 
known the values that are held in the highest regard within the con-
stitutional community. Together these features point to a fourth vir-
tue: the primacy of members. Member primacy transforms the consti-
tutional function from structuring the modalities of governance to 
bringing the constitution closer to the membership and signaling to 
the membership that its participation in the project of constitutional-
ism is necessary to the successful fruition of the community. Let us 
begin with the fourth virtue. 
 Constitutional theory correctly holds that constitutions trace their 
origin to an uncommon manifestation of popular sovereignty, a revo-
lutionary expression of self-definition that marks a break from the 
past to proclaim the formation of a new entity.127 For Emmanuel Sie-
yès, the famed narrator of the French Revolution, the genesis of this 
extraordinary act is the notion of the pouvoir constituant, which, in 
translation, literally means the constituting power.128 The constitut-
ing power was then, and remains today as a matter of positive politi-
cal theory, the people. That explains why, to the question “What is 
the constituting power?” Sieyès answered everything.129 The people 
are the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the base and 
the nucleus.  
 The greatest virtue of a constitution is its window into the soul of 
a defined community of peoples. Whether a state, an institution, a 
team, a family, or otherwise, individuals as constituted bodies want 
more for themselves than a simple statement of standards of govern-
ance. They define their venture in terms grander than structures and 
rules of admission. Their constitution is a repository of thought, ac-
tion, norms, practices, expectations, and outlook on themselves, the 
world, and their role within it. Therefore, the very first rule of consti-
 127.  See, e.g., Anne Peters, The Constitutionalisation of the European Union—Without 
the Constitutional Treaty, in THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 35, 46 (Sonja 
Puntscher Riekmann & Wolfgang Wessels eds., 2006). 
 128.  EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, QU’EST-CE QUE LE TIERS ÉTAT? (Éditions du Bou-
cher) (2002). 
 129.  Id. at 1. 
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tutionalism is that the constitution should take the form given to it 
by its members:  
[A] constitution must accommodate the particular people it is cre-
ated for, bending here and there to their habits, opinions, and cir-
cumstances; that is to say, to accident if not force. In just this 
manner, a constitution may embrace universal principles, but it 
does so for a particular people, marking its boundaries by way of 
the people, even while attempting to cultivate and sustain that 
people’s attachment to the constitution.130
 By granting member primacy its just import, we compel ourselves 
to give greater attention to what makes a constitution a constitution. 
What is a constitution? Aristotle was right when he wrote “the com-
munity is the constitution.”131 It is a path to freedom and growth, not 
only because of the liberty-granting and liberty-preserving content 
that should shape it, but also because of what it portends for a com-
munity’s self-determined power to define and redefine itself in the 
very act of constituting the community. It is therefore mistaken to 
think of a constitution as something that freezes time at the moment 
of the founding design. Quite the contrary, people “should not think it 
slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their 
salvation.”132 A constitution, then, is much more than just a text. 
 Still, constitutions should nevertheless be written. It is of course 
true that much, perhaps even most, of a constitution cannot be cap-
tured in a constitutional text. This is especially true in the case of the 
United States. The grand tradition of American constitutionalism 
folds within itself political practices, democratic conventions, extra-
canonical statutes, presidential orders, administrative regulations, 
and extraconstitutional amendments whose entrenchment in the 
American constitutional order belies the text of the United States 
Constitution.133 Imagine the surprise that would greet a new consti-
tutional democracy hoping to replicate the American experience on 
its soil simply by the wholesale adoption of the unmodified text of the 
United States Constitution. It would be unlikely to succeed because 
the story of American constitutionalism extends well beyond the four 
 130.  George Thomas, The Tensions of Constitutional Democracy, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
793, 793-94 (2007) (reviewing GEORGE THOMAS, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING 
AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER (2007)). 
 131.  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book III, ch. 4, at 71 (C.D.C. Reeve trans. 1998). 
 132.  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book V, ch. 9, at 216 (H. W. C. DAVIS ed. 1908). 
 133.  See, e.g., Ernest Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J.
408, 414 (2007). 
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corners of its text.134 It is therefore right to ask, as John Gardner 
does, whether a constitution can ever be fully written.135
 We must concede that a constitution may never be a completely or 
exclusively written constitution. But the signature piece of a commu-
nity’s constitution should nonetheless be written. This view derives 
from conceiving of a constitution as a community-based instrument 
whose primary purpose is to govern members of a community accord-
ing to a structure of separated powers marshaled in the service of 
some identifiable objective, but whose promise reaches far beyond. 
That powerfully compelling part of the promise of a constitution is to 
build and sustain a community of persons who together forge and 
develop an identity in common cause.  
 To say that a constitution should be written does not, however, tell 
us what should appear in its text. In addition to providing for the 
constitutional basics, a constitution should incorporate the two final 
constitutional virtues in its text: first, privileges and protections for 
its members and nonmembers; and second, a hierarchy of values. 
Unlike some who argue that constitutions should necessarily contain 
rights and liberties for their members,136 I take the view that rights 
and liberties are only desirable features of constitutions, not indis-
pensable ones. This derives from my descriptive effort to define 
constitutionalism across all of its forms. While protection for rights 
and liberties may be a fundamental element of liberal democratic 
constitutionalism, is it a basic requirement of any constitution? I 
think the answer is no. But that does not mean that all constitutions 
should not aspire to include it in their text—which is why privileges 
and protections fall within the category of constitutional virtues, not 
of constitutional basics. 
 Constitutions should therefore aspire to grant privileges and pro-
tections to its membership and, preferably, to its nonmembership as 
well. As to members, constitutions should guard them against the 
powers enjoyed by the body or bodies created to govern the communi-
ty. Constitutions should also guard members against the action and 
inaction of fellow members. In granting these rights and liberties to 
members, constitutions extend to members both the privilege of act-
ing positively in specified ways and the protection from designated 
 134.  A. E. Dick Howard, Toward Constitutional Democracy: An American Perspective,
19 J.L. & POL. 285, 293-94 (2003). 
 135.  See John Gardner, Can There Be a Written Constitution?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 162 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011); see also Mattias Kumm, 
Beyond Golf Clubs and the Judicialization of Politics: Why Europe has a Constitution 
Properly So Called, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 505, 508 (2006) (discussing whether writtenness is a 
necessary feature of constitutionalism); Jane Pek, Note, Things Better Left Unwritten?: 
Constitutional Text and the Rule of Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1979 (2008) (comparing the 
merits of written and unwritten constitutions). 
 136.  See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 227 (1993). 
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actions deemed objectionable. Constitutions would also do well to ex-
tend privileges and protections to nonmembers. These privileges and 
protections may differ in material respects from those granted to 
members. But constitutions should express some solicitude for non-
members for the very reason that nonmembers are nonmembers: 
they are unrepresented in the community and consequently have no 
authority to speak to its organization, structure, and mission. It is 
their lack of voice that demands the constitution recognize their pow-
erlessness by acknowledging them in some way. 
 It is not enough to grant privileges and protections. Constitutions 
should also identify within their text the most important values held 
by the community. All communities develop within them, either at 
their genesis or in the evolution of time, a hierarchy of standards or 
principles pursuant to which one could construct a pyramidal chart 
displaying the most important values at and near the summit all the 
way down to the least important ones. These values may change in 
the life of the community, such that something that was valued high-
ly at the founding may depreciate in its value to the community over 
the years, or altogether new ones may take root and displace older 
ones. Those are momentous developments in the life of a constitu-
tional community. Constitutions should therefore not only state their 
values in a descriptive hierarchy but remain updated to reflect the 
current landscape of values.  
 Three corollary points follow from distinguishing among the im-
portance of constitutional values. First, as a practical matter, en-
shrining a hierarchy of values will assist in resolving disputes that 
develop within the community. Second, a constitutional community 
could of course choose not to conceive of its values along a sliding 
scale. Indeed, a community may reasonably resolve that all values 
are equally meritorious—but such a decision should be stated in the 
constitutional text in the interest of predictability and fair notice. 
And third, insofar as values may change in the life of a constitutional 
community, the constitutional text should state how members may 
amend the constitution in order to reflect the new ranking of consti-
tutional values. This last point is exceedingly important because the 
power to amend the constitution is the most basic of all privileges 
and protections that should attach to constitutional membership.  
C.   Constitutional Camouflage 
 The boundaries that typically set apart one constitution from 
another are less rigid than they otherwise appear to be precisely be-
cause the conventional distinctions among public, private, interna-
tional, national, and local constitutions have become blurred in the 
age of constitutionalism. At a time when anyone and everyone adopts 
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a constitution to govern associations and activities, often the conse-
quence is to diminish the great promise that constitutionalism holds 
for communities, be they states, unions, companies, or groups. I have 
posited that this promise manifests itself in four ways, each of which 
combines with the others to create a culture of active citizenship 
within the constitutional community: a written charter, privileges 
and protections for members and nonmembers, a hierarchy of com-
munity values, and member primacy. Those constitutional virtues, 
which only some constitutions exhibit, stand in contrast to the three 
constitutional basics that we reliably find in all constitutions.  
 Yet even constitutions that exhibit one or more constitutional vir-
tues can sometimes distort the promise of constitutionalism. Consid-
er what I call camouflage constitutionalism. Some states adopt 
constitutions reflecting most if not all of the constitutional virtues. 
But what their constitutions proclaim on their face conceals the 
darkness that lurks beneath. Constitutional virtues are sometimes 
mere pretense for disingenuous motives, for instance to appease or 
mislead the international community, to deceive their own citizens, 
or to entrench existing structures of power imbalance and inequali-
ty.137 Proof positive are the most authoritarian states in the world,138
all of which have written constitutions that purport to make citizens 
foremost in the constitutional order139 and to guarantee them liberal 
democratic rights.140 Nothing, of course, could be less truthful be-
cause the entrenched leaders in these wicked regimes deny even the 
most basic freedoms to everyone but themselves.141
 137.  ISSA G. SHIVJI, WHERE IS UHURU? REFLECTIONS ON THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRA-
CY IN AFRICA 50-63 (Godwin R. Murunga ed., 2009). 
 138.  I rely on the Economist’s Democracy Index for this claim. See Economist Intelli-
gence Unit, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008, ECONOMIST (2008), 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf. 
 139.  See, e.g., CONSTITUTION DU LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Mar. 31, 1996, tit. I, art. 3 
(Chad) (placing sovereignty in the people themselves); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF GUINEA-BISSAU May 6, 1984, tit. I, art. 2, § 1 (amended 1991) (same); CONSTITUTION 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR May 10, 2008, ch. I, art. 3 (same); 
??????????? ????????????? [CONSTITUTION] Sep. 26, 2008, § I, art. 2 (Turkm.) (same); 
O’ZBEKISTON RESPUBLIKASI KONSTITUTSIYASI [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 8, 1992, pt. I, ch. 1, art. 
2 (Uzb.) (same). 
 140.  See, e.g., CONSTITUTION DU LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Mar. 31, 1996, tit. II (Chad) 
(protecting liberal democratic rights and liberties); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
GUINEA-BISSAU May 6, 1984, tit. II (amended 1991) (same); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUB-
LIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR May 10, 2008, ch. VIII (same); ??????????? ?????????????
[CONSTITUTION] Sept. 26, 2008, § II (Turkm.) (same); O’ZBEKISTON RESPUBLIKASI KONSTI-
TUTSIYASI [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 8, 1992, pt. II (Uzb.) (same).  
 141.  On this point, recent evidence suggests that authoritarian regimes that engage in 
torture are more likely to ratify the Convention Against Torture than others. See James R. 
Hollyer & B. Peter Rosendorff, Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention 
Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics and Non-Compliance (Sept. 29, 2010) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684916. 
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 Constitutionalism has, in those cases, become a powerfully com-
pelling stand-in for fairness, justice, and the endless quest for good. 
These interlopers and their reprehensible intentions have comman-
deered constitutionalism to achieve ends that are inconsistent with 
constitutionalism’s virtues. They stand behind the tradition of consti-
tutionalism to cloak themselves in the veil of legitimacy that only 
constitutionalism can confer. That is the power of constitutionalism: 
it can legitimize illegitimate institutions.142 It can bless people and 
institutions with a presumption of righteousness that would other-
wise extend beyond their reach. Constitutionalism, therefore, exerts 
something of a sanitizing effect. In this way, the power of constitu-
tionalism is also its tragic failure. By its very nature, a constitution is 
an empty cast that can be shaped and fitted to comport with even the 
most evil designs. It is a malleable, impressionable, and maneuverable 
mold that has no encoded commands—which is why a constitution 
can in one place serve as a dispassionate charter for the impersonal 
rule of law, while at the same time serve in another place as a rigged 
playbook that facilitates the self-interested rule of man.143
 If deployed inartfully, constitutionalism may also actually divest 
written political and civil rights of their force and meaning. Consider 
the constitutions of Poland and Belarus. The Polish Constitution pro-
tects the traditional menu of speech, assembly, expression, equality, 
religion, and criminal defense rights.144 For its part, the Belarusian 
Constitution does the same, protecting the same group of rights for 
which the United States Bill of Rights is known.145 But both the 
Polish and Belarusian Constitutions do something that the United 
States Bill of Rights does not: they enshrine social and economic 
rights, namely the right to a minimum wage,146 to a job,147 to health 
care,148 to education,149 to housing,150 paid vacation,151 a gradually 
improving standard of life,152 and the right to a clean environment.153
 Although social and economic rights are privileges toward which 
society should aspire, to identify them as justiciable rights runs the 
 142.  GORAN HYDEN, AFRICAN POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 106 (2006). 
 143.  For a discussion of a constitution as a “personal pact” serving the interest of rulers 
alone, see Augusto Zimmermann, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: The Failure of 
Constitutionalism in Brazil, in THE RULE OF LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 101, 101-
46 (Mortimer Sellers & Tadeusz Tomaszewski eds., 2010).
 144.  KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, ch. II (Pol.). 
 145.  ??????????? [CONSTITUTION] May 1, 1994, § 2 (Belr.) (amended 1996). 
 146.  KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, ch. II, art. 
65(4) (Pol.). 
 147.  Id. at art. 65(1). 
 148.  Id. at art. 68. 
 149.  Id. at art. 70. 
 150.  ??????????? [CONSTITUTION] May 1, 1994, § 2 (Belr.) (amended 1996). 
 151.  Id. at art. 43. 
 152.  Id. at art. 21. 
 153.  Id. at art. 46. 
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risk of evaporating from the text its force and moral authority.154 It is 
dangerous to put social and economic rights into a constitution be-
cause those are not self-executing rights, nor do they require what 
rights typically require: restraint from the state and a promise not to 
overreach into the personal space of citizens. Quite the contrary, the-
se positive rights require capital expenditures from the state—and 
the state does not have infinite resources at its disposal. Here is the 
problem: How can a constitution proclaim certain guarantees in its 
text yet fail to fulfill those promises? For instance, imagine a consti-
tutional right to food and housing, yet citizens see around them the 
hungry and the homeless.  
 This jarring disconnect between rhetoric and reality is potentially 
catastrophic for constitutionalism. It turns the constitution from a 
grand charter that defines the community to nothing more than a 
piece of paper whose content no longer commands the respect of the 
membership because the constitution does not mean what it says. 
What risks happening is precisely what has befallen Russia in the 
aftermath of its constitutional revolution: Russians do not see a con-
nection between their constitution and their government because the 
latter exists largely in name alone.155 Still, despite this very substan-
tial risk, some states with increasingly tight budgets and with abso-
lutely no realistic capacity of financing social and economic rights 
nevertheless entrench these socio-economic rights in their constitu-
tion. Whether they do so with ill-intent to deceive their members or 
with a genuine lack of appreciation about the positive action those 
rights require and entail, the disheartening result is nonetheless the 
same: constitutionalism loses its moral standing. 
IV.   CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS
 The distinction between constitutional basics and constitutional 
virtues is therefore not watertight. Even constitutions that appear to 
exhibit constitutional virtues—for instance the virtues of member 
primacy and of enshrining privileges and protections—may still fall 
short of the promise of constitutionalism. But the distinction between 
constitutional basics and constitutional virtues may nevertheless be 
more helpful than distinguishing between public and private consti-
tutions or among international, national, and local ones. It allows us 
to compare constitutions across meaningful dimensions beyond simp-
ly territoriality and state action. It gives us the tools to engage in a 
critical comparative assessment of constitutional texts. To see how, 
 154.  Some constitutions recognize this problem and consequently make these socio-
economic rights nonjusticiable statements of policy direction rather than policy prescription. 
See, e.g., INDIA CONST., pt. IV, art. 37; IR. CONST., art. 45. 
 155.  ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 1985-1996, at 209 (1997). 
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let us compare two constitutions using the taxonomy of constitutional 
basics and constitutional virtues: the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of the National Collegiate Athletic Association156
(“NCAA”). Which constitution more closely achieves the aspiration 
embodied in constitutional virtues? The answer, at least initially, is 
not altogether obvious. 
A.   The Constitutional Text 
 Begin with the basics of the text of both the United States Consti-
tution and the NCAA Constitution. Recall my claim: all constitu-
tions—whether they are for states, partnerships, corporations, asso-
ciations, or international organizations—do three things. First, they 
separate powers by creating an internal structure of authority that 
serves as a referent for disputes. Second, they identify or create a 
class of constituents who must govern themselves according to it. 
And third, they embrace a purpose or a mission that guides constitu-
ents and their governors in the conduct of their affairs, both internal 
to the group and external toward the wider world. The Constitution 
of the United States and the NCAA both satisfy each of those items. 
 First, the United States Constitution separates powers among 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.157 This 
separation of powers facilitates the settlement of disputes insofar as 
the constitutional text grants designated powers to particular 
branches, for instance the power to coin money158 and to establish 
post offices to the legislature,159 the power to make treaties160 and to 
fill vacancies during Senate recesses to the executive,161 and the pow-
er to hear cases162 and to resolve controversies to the judiciary.163
Separating powers in this way, and assigning functions to the branch 
best equipped to discharge that function, enhances the efficiency and 
accountability of government.164
 The NCAA Constitution, likewise, separates powers in an elabo-
rate manner. The entire Association is governed by an Executive 
Committee consisting of twenty members representing each of the 
 156.  Unless otherwise stated, I will refer to the Division I NCAA Constitution for pur-
poses of this discussion. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Constitution, in 2010-11
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL (Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Constitution of the NCAA].
 157.  U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III.  
 158.  Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 159.  Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 160.  Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 161. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 162.  Id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 163.  Id.
 164.  Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 4, 12 (1987). 
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three Divisions that comprise the NCAA.165 The Association has 
overall responsibility for budgetary, hiring, dispute-resolution, and 
long-range planning matters.166 Each of the three Divisions is man-
aged by a board of directors or its equivalent, each of which is re-
sponsible for setting policy for its respective Division.167 The Division 
I Board of Directors oversees a Leadership Council and a separate 
Legislative Council, the former being responsible for making fiscal, 
academic, and other recommendations to the Board of Directors,168
and the latter for interpreting bylaws and serving as the primary leg-
islative authority.169 Final legislative authority rests with the Board 
of Directors, which has the power to accept or reject the Legislative 
Council’s proposals or duly-adopted legislation.170
 Second, the United States Constitution speaks directly to the per-
sons who have bound themselves to govern their actions according to 
it. “We the People of the United States,” begins the constitutional 
text, “do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America.”171 There is another category of individuals who are 
bound by the Constitution: the states that comprise the United 
States. The nine states’ ratification of the document brought the 
charter into force and, as a result, extended its application across all 
thirteen states.172 And third, the United States Constitution embrac-
es, in its text, a mission that defines the collective purpose Americans 
set for themselves: “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, 
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity.”173
 With respect to the NCAA, its constitution identifies its member-
ship with great detail. The text makes clear that NCAA members are 
not student-athletes and coaches but rather the institutions to which 
they belong: colleges and universities. The NCAA Constitution 
identifies five classes of membership: active members, which are ac-
credited two-year or four-year institutions of higher education;174 pro-
visional members, which are two-year or four-year colleges and uni-
versities that have applied for membership to the NCAA;175 member 
conferences, which comprise a group of colleges and universities that 
 165.  Constitution of the NCAA, supra note 156, § 4.1.1. 
 166.  Id. § 4.1.2. 
 167.  Id. Figure 4-2, at 29. 
 168.  Id. § 4.5.2. 
 169.  Id. § 4.6.2. 
 170.  Id. § 4.2.2. 
 171.  U.S. CONST., pmbl. 
 172.  Id. at art. VII. 
 173.  Id. at pmbl. 
 174.  Constitution of the NCAA, supra note 156, § 3.02.3.1. 
 175.  Id. § 3.02.3.2. 
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compete under the auspices of the NCAA;176 affiliated members, 
which are nonprofit groups or associations whose affairs are directly 
related to the NCAA;177 and corresponding members, which include 
institutions, nonprofit organizations, or conferences that are ineligi-
ble for membership but nonetheless wish to receive NCAA publica-
tions and mailings.178
 The NCAA’s members and its governing institutions work toward 
achieving a number of purposes. The first basic purpose is amateur-
ism, to which the Constitution refers as the effort to “maintain inter-
collegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program 
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, 
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics 
and professional sports.”179 The NCAA has also tasked itself with 
other purposes—namely administrative ones like facilitating the cre-
ation and continuity of intercollegiate sports,180 occupying a historical 
role in cataloguing competition records,181 and setting standards for 
eligibility and participation,182—and, among others, cultivating a cul-
ture of institutional accountability and control among its member-
ship.183 The NCAA has therefore given itself several responsibilities 
that constitute its larger mission and organizational purpose. 
 It is hardly a revelation that the United States Constitution and 
the NCAA Constitution both satisfy the constitutional basics. All 
constitutions meet those requirements. But whether the United 
States and NCAA Constitutions fulfill the demanding criteria of con-
stitutional virtues is another matter. Before we assess how the two 
constitutions fare on those grounds, it bears recalling the four consti-
tutional virtues introduced in the previous Part: writtenness, mem-
ber and nonmember privileges and protections, constitutional hierar-
chy, and member primacy. 
 Turning to the United States Constitution, it appears to exhibit 
three of the four virtues. First, it is a written constitution. Although 
much of the Constitution remains either unwritten or written in a 
number of subsidiary texts,184 it is known and understood as a writ-
ten document which people can touch and identify and to which they 
can reliably point as evidence of a constituted state. Second, the Con-
stitution extends privileges and protections to the constitutional 
 176.  Id. § 3.02.3.3. 
 177.  Id. § 3.02.3.4. 
 178.  Id. § 3.02.3.5. 
 179.  Id. § 1.3.1. 
 180.  Id. § 1.2(a), (d). 
 181.  Id. § 1.2(e). 
 182.  Id. § 1.2(c), (f), (i). 
 183.  Id. § 1.2(b). 
 184.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J.
1215, 1264 (2001) (describing super-statutes as quasi-constitutional). 
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community, including both members and nonmembers.185 But the 
United States Constitution does not establish a hierarchy of rights 
that indicates which values or principles are held in the highest re-
gard within the constitutional community. The Bill of Rights en-
shrines a menu of rights but does not, by its text, identify which of 
those rights stands above or below others.186 Fourth, the Constitution 
honors the principle of member primacy insofar as it gives its mem-
bers the ultimate power to amend its text by way of either a constitu-
tional convention or a congressional procedure in tandem with state 
ratification.187 It may also be possible to amend the constitution by a 
simple majority vote in a national referendum.188 Three out of four 
constitutional virtues: that is a good, though not perfect, record. 
 In contrast, the NCAA Constitution appears to land on all four 
bases. First, it is a written constitution, much like the United States 
Constitution—only more so. It is several thousand words longer than 
the United States Constitution and goes into considerable specificity 
to detail with intricate precision its rules, requirements, and pro-
scriptions. In many ways, the NCAA Constitution approximates what 
we might expect of a congressional statute. But it would be inaccu-
rate to draw that analogy because there also exist NCAA bylaws, 
which are better viewed as the counterpart to United States statutes. 
Second, the NCAA Constitution extends privileges and protections to 
its members and, importantly, to its nonmembers as well. Each of the 
five classes of membership has some measure of rights or entitle-
ments under the NCAA Constitution. For example, active members 
have the right to compete and vote on proposed legislation189 and af-
filiated members have the right to send a nonvoting member to 
NCAA conventions.190 But in addition to providing privileges and pro-
tections to its members, the NCAA Constitution also protects the in-
 185.  By the use of the term members, I refer to those constituents of the constitutional 
community who have agreed to be bound by the Constitution. In the case of the United 
States, the relevant members are the citizens of the United States and the several states. 
Citizens and the states have rights under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, respectively. 
See U.S. CONST. amends. IX & X. But noncitizens—and therefore nonmembers—also have 
privileges and protections under the Bill of Rights. For example, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies to both citizens and noncitizens within the territorial jurisdiction of the Unit-
ed States. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 
530 (1954); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 186.  But the Supreme Court has, through its decisions, fashioned a hierarchy of sorts 
among forms of expression: “Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy 
in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most 
protection position; commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded 
as a sort of second-class expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the least protec-
tion of all.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 187.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 188.  Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1060 (1988). 
 189.  Constitution of the NCAA, supra note 156, § 3.02.3.1. 
 190.  Id. § 3.02.3.4. 
2012]  THE CULT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 405
                 
terests of its nonmembers, namely those of the student-athletes who 
compete in intercollegiate athletics under the rules promulgated by 
the NCAA. Specifically, the Constitution makes it the responsibility 
of member institutions to promote educational opportunities,191 cul-
tural diversity and gender equality,192 health and safety;193 to culti-
vate positive working relationships between student-athletes and 
their coaches;194 as well as to protect student-athletes from being ex-
ploited for professional and commercial purposes.195 This is a particu-
larly laudable part of the NCAA Constitution because it gives voice to 
a group whose interests are not represented at the level of institu-
tional policymaking.  
 The NCAA Constitution gets the other two items right, at least as 
a textual matter: first, it honors the principle of member primacy; 
and second, it establishes a hierarchy of values or principles. As to 
the first item, the NCAA Constitution begins and ends with its mem-
bership. The member institutions control the Executive Committee,196
the Board of Directors,197 the Leadership Council,198 and the Legisla-
tive Council.199 Second, the NCAA Constitution establishes tiers of 
provisions subject to varying thresholds for amendment. This is a 
significant departure from the United States Constitution because it 
signals quite clearly which values and principles demand greater 
solicitude and are worthy of greater watchfulness. Case in point: 
amending a dominant provision requires a two-thirds majority vote 
from the total membership of the NCAA.200 Issues that fall under this 
category include the mission of the Association201 and institutional 
duties of care toward student-athletes.202 Alternatively, amending a 
common provision demands only a majority vote from each of the 
three divisions voting separately.203 Such matters include the defi-
nition of a Senior Woman Administrator and the privileges that flow 
from having a female director of athletics.204 Third, a division-
dominant provision—for example, the revenue-sharing agreement205—
requires a two-thirds majority vote from all delegates attending a 
 191.  Id. § 2.2.1. 
 192.  Id. § 2.2.2. 
 193.  Id § 2.2.3. 
 194.  Id. §§ 2.2.4, 2.2.5. 
 195.  Id. § 2.9. 
 196.  Id. § 4.1. 
 197.  Id. § 4.2. 
 198.  Id. § 4.5. 
 199.  Id. § 4.6. 
 200.  NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, User’s Guide, in 2010-11 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL ix (Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter NCAA User’s Guide].
 201.  Constitution of the NCAA, supra note 156, § 1.2. 
 202.  Id. § 2.2. 
 203.  NCAA User’s Guide, supra note 200. 
 204.  Constitution of the NCAA, supra note 156, § 4.02.4.1. 
 205.  Id. § 4.01.2.2. 
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division convention.206 As a result, the NCAA Constitution satisfies 
all four constitutional virtues whereas the United States Constitu-
tion achieves only three. 
B.   Beyond the Constitutional Text 
 But perhaps we ought to look beyond the constitutional text to 
probe more deeply whether the United States and NCAA Constitu-
tions do indeed live up to these constitutional virtues. That is the 
fear, after all, that the cult of constitutionalism has brought to life: 
constitutions in name alone masquerading as constitutions in sub-
stance, the former purporting to achieve the promise of the latter un-
der the deceptive cover of its attractive exterior. For, on its face, a 
constitution may appear to meet both the constitutional basics and 
the constitutional virtues, but in reality it may do no more than satis-
fy the basics of constitutionalism, which is something that all consti-
tutions do as a matter of fact.  
 Neither the United States Constitution nor the NCAA Constitu-
tion may be defensibly described as a constitution in name alone. 
Both meet the requirements of constitutional basics and both also go 
a significant way toward achieving the virtues of constitutionalism. 
Still, though both possess the necessary and aspirational elements of 
a constitution, they express them in different ways. On that score, 
two points call for our attention: first, the two constitutions differ in 
flexibility, which has implications for the virtue of member primacy; 
and second, they may also differ in public perception, which has im-
plications for their sociological legitimacy. Let us briefly explore each 
of these in turn. 
 On a scale of constitutional malleability, the United States Consti-
tution stands at or near the very top while the NCAA Constitution 
falls at or near the very bottom. The NCAA Constitution is a rigid 
document characterized by its overwhelming statute-like detail that 
belies what one might usually find in a constitutional text. In con-
trast, the United States Constitution is flexible, written in broad 
strokes, and outlines a basic structure of government, collective pur-
pose, and citizen rights and responsibilities, with the preponderance 
of the details left to be added later by legislative, executive, judicial, 
and civic actors. This hints at a connection between constitutional 
flexibility and constitutional specificity that is worth pursuing. It 
may be best examined through the prism of constitutional change.  
 A constitutional text does not necessarily constrain how constitu-
tional change can occur in a constitutional community. Constitutional 
change can actually occur in ways that belie the procedural rules en-
 206.  NCAA User’s Guide, supra note 200. 
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shrined in the constitutional text. That is the case in the United 
States, where the Constitution has been amended in nontextual 
ways. Those types of nontextual constitutional amendments have 
been possible largely because of the generalities with which the Con-
stitution is written. Although the Constitution establishes, in its text, 
two general ways amendments may be proposed—by a specific se-
quence of congressional and state legislative supermajority action, or 
through a constitutional convention207—it has also been amended in 
ways that do not conform with those procedures.208 That is because 
those two procedures for amending the Constitution are not exhaus-
tive; they are merely the only ones mentioned in the text.209 What is 
more, judicial interpretations of the Constitution may themselves 
give rise to the equivalent of a constitutional amendment.210
 This makes the United States Constitution exceedingly malleable 
insofar as it may be altered in several ways, including those that are 
not contemplated by its text. The rise of the political parties, the 
creation of the administrative state, the expansion of national execu-
tive powers in the twentieth century, the civil rights revolution211—
these constitute unwritten constitutional amendments that occurred 
beyond the constitutional amendment rules entrenched in the consti-
tutional text. They instead developed organically in a convergence of 
thought and action by popular movements, judicial actors, and the 
political branches. On the one hand, flexibility is an asset because it 
allows a constitutional community to develop organically, to meet 
pressing needs, or even to respond to crises that the textual amend-
ment procedures cannot accommodate either for time constraints or 
because of exacting supermajority thresholds.212 On the other hand, 
this measure of flexibility risks undermining the transparency that 
constitutionalism should foster. If it is possible to alter the Constitu-
tion in meaning, but simultaneously not in form, that can lead to a 
troubling disunity between appearance and reality, which can itself 
entrench constitutional contradictions or, worse still, trigger fears of 
constitutional subversion. 
 207.  U.S. CONST. art V. 
 208.  See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been 
Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in RE-
SPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
13, 25-32 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
 209.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). 
 210.  See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 142 (2d ed. 2005). 
 211.  David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 884 (1996); see also David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (chronicling and theorizing the development of unwritten 
amendments to the United States Constitution). 
 212.  The United States Constitution is one of the world’s most, if not the most, difficult 
constitution to amend. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 20-22,
160 (2006). 
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 In contrast, the NCAA Constitution has a strict, exhaustive, and 
expressly exclusive amendment process. The amendment rules span 
nearly ten pages of single-spaced full-sized page text.213 The NCAA 
Constitution sets out detailed procedures specifying how to amend it, 
who may do so, what subjects are susceptible to amendment, and what 
particular majority or supermajority voting thresholds are required. 
There is therefore no surprise about how the NCAA Constitution may 
lawfully be amended. That is one significant constitutional amend-
ment difference between the NCAA and United States Constitutions. 
 There is another significant difference between the NCAA Consti-
tution and the United States Constitution with respect to constitu-
tional amendments. Unlike the United States Constitution—which 
permits, though does not expressly authorize, judicial constitutional 
amendments—the NCAA Constitution provides for the equivalent 
of judicial constitutional amendments by cataloguing in rigorous 
detail a series of rules for how the Board of Directors, Legislative 
Council, and subcommittees are to interpret its text and accompany-
ing bylaws.214 The consequence of these strict rules is to promote 
transparency in the constitutional life of the community. Its rigidity 
establishes clarity about how the constitution is to evolve, what is 
amenable to amendment, and who has the authority to initiate and 
consummate those constitutional changes.  
 The specificity of the NCAA Constitution is a useful entrée into 
the second point of comparison between it and the United States 
Constitution: public perception. In general, the United States Consti-
tution commands greater deference and respect than the NCAA Con-
stitution. This is surely not surprising given that one is a national 
constitution that applies directly to everyone and the latter is a 
specialized constitution that applies directly only to a smaller group 
of persons. But something more helps explain the enhanced authority 
of the United States Constitution over the NCAA Constitution: it is a 
short document written in expansive and general terms. Indeed, the 
particularized content of the NCAA Constitution was precisely what 
led the legendary former college basketball coach, Bobby Knight, to 
curse it: “This thing needs to be thrown out and we need to start all 
over again and we need to make something that’s simple, that we can 
understand, and something that is oriented toward what’s good for 
kids.”215 What troubled Knight was that the NCAA’s constitutional 
labyrinth actually did more harm than good because the consequence 
of its meticulous specificity was to obscure the rules instead of illu-
 213.  Constitution of the NCAA, supra note 156, §§ 5.3-5.4. 
 214.  Id. § 5.4. 
 215.  Bobby Knight, Basketball Coach, Texas Tech University, Remarks at the National 
Press Club Newsmaker Luncheon (Sept. 27, 2004) (transcript available in the Eric 
Friedham Library). 
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minating them. Knight recounted his frustrating experience of work-
ing in tandem with a colleague to take a forty-question, open-book 
examination on the NCAA’s Constitution and bylaws, only to find 
that “[t]here were seven questions that we actually couldn’t find the 
answer to” and “six questions that could be given at least two differ-
ent answers.”216 It is no wonder, then, that Knight is not a fan of the 
NCAA Constitution.  
 But Knight was gesturing to a point much larger than merely 
whether the NCAA Constitution is so long that it breeds confusion. 
He was probing the edges of an incredibly important question that 
has puzzled constitutional theorists for ages: How do we create a 
culture of constitutionalism? Creating a constitutional culture is a 
prerequisite to entrenching in a people what the leading constitu-
tional theorist of his time, Albert Venn Dicey, called the “spirit of le-
gality.”217 This spirit is less tangible than ethereal, but it breeds a 
very real feeling of attachment to the constitutional community. Call 
it a collective moral bond that unites the membership,218 or perhaps 
something as strong as what Durkheim referred to as “social solidari-
ty” anchored in enduring institutional arrangements,219 or even 
something less concrete as the psychic relation that Kelsen suggested 
bound the citizen to her state.220 Whatever it is called, there is some 
discernible type of psychological component underpinning constitu-
tionalism that is indispensable to breathing legitimacy into the 
constitutional text. It is a prerequisite to creating a culture of consti-
tutionalism. To say it is a prerequisite, though, does not tell us how 
to achieve it. 
 To begin to understand how to cultivate a culture of constitution-
alism, it is worth turning again to Bobby Knight. He states in bril-
liant clarity one of the key differences between the United States 
Constitution and the NCAA Constitution, with a meaningful biblical 
reference for added emphasis: 
Here is a copy of the NCAA manual. (Laughter.) . . . This is 
what I’m supposed to memorize. Now listen to it hit the floor. (The 
manual hits the floor with a thud.) That’s the NCAA manual. 
. . .
Here is the Constitution of the United States. (Laughter.) I 
mean, it’s got 15 pages, and I mean, it’s served us for a long time. 
And this includes 22 Amendments; this includes 22 Amendments 
 216.  Id.
 217.  A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 100 
(8th ed. Liberty Fund 1982) (1885). 
 218.  ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF 
SOCIAL THEORY (1976). 
 219.  EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 63 (George Simpson 
trans., 1933). 
 220.  HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 288 (Max Knight trans., 1967). 
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to the original document. We’ve only changed it 22 times. They’ve 
changed NCAA rules 22 times this morning! (Laughter.) 
And even beyond that, you know, I mean, Moses wrote 10 
things on a rock that have lasted millenniums and were very clear 
and very precise, and a great majority of the world has lived on 
those tenets that Moses wrote.221
Return now to the early American experience. The living proof of the 
American Revolution is the United States Constitution that followed 
shortly after the Articles of Confederation. The former replaced the 
latter because it was thought to better capture the vision for an 
American union than the decentralizing and disunifying Articles.222
The challenge that the constitutional drafters had given them-
selves—and ultimately achieved—was to triumph over the localism 
that made the American revolutionaries see themselves as thirteen 
disparate colonies rather than one new nation.223 The effort to create 
a political culture rooted in an American identity began with the new 
constitutional text. This was a strategic choice to draw from the 
American tradition of textuality—the great reverence that early 
Americans had for texts, particularly religious texts.224 This peculiar-
ly American veneration for their founding charter prompted Thomas 
Paine to observe that the United States Constitution became, for 
Americans, something of a “political bible,”225 a copy of which every 
American held close to herself, both to engage with the text and to 
hold accountable their agents in government.226
 To be an American at the founding, and even still today, is to be-
lieve deeply in the moral force of the written word.227 By enshrining 
in a tangible, touchable, and readable charter the principles that de-
fined Americans and that would later come to define their purpose, 
the framers tapped into the common American practice to connect, 
through texts, personhood with something otherworldly. In the case 
of the Constitution, that otherworldly manifestation was nationhood. 
As much as the new constitution was a reference point for the rules 
and values that bound Americans to their state and to themselves, it 
also became a symbol of nationhood and American identity.  
 221.  Bobby Knight, Basketball Coach, Texas Tech University, Remarks at the National 
Press Club Newsmaker Luncheon (Sept. 27, 2004) (transcript available in the Eric 
Friedham Library). 
 222.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 12 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 223.  CAROL BERKIN, A BRILLIANT SOLUTION: INVENTING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
17-18 (2002). 
 224.  Wayne Franklin, The US Constitution and the Textuality of American Culture, in 
WRITING A NATIONAL IDENTITY: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9, 10 (Vivien Hart & Shannon C. Stimson eds., 1993). 
 225.  THOMAS PAINE, supra note 33. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 
260 (1998). 
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 The spirit of the document conveyed to Americans, communicated 
to the world and encapsulated for posterity the revolutionary ideals 
that had inspired this new American charter. Perhaps the single 
most important reason why the Constitution could, as a matter of 
both practice and theory, achieve all of these and other disparate 
purposes was its short length, one of the great virtues of the docu-
ment. Indeed, its brevity helps us discern the very source of its 
force.228 That undeniable force springs from the short and accessible 
arrangement of the constitutional text. The document was, in Rossit-
er’s brilliant formulation, “[p]lain to the point of severity, frugal to 
the point of austerity, laconic to the point of aphorism.”229 It is “singu-
larly brief and expressive,” in Story’s account.230 As Amar writes in 
his masterful study of the American Constitution, this particularly 
pithy style of constitutional drafting invites Americans to discover its 
content.231 It is something, observes one scholar, “that the individual 
citizen can affirm as his own,”232 something that is at once readily 
comprehensible and worthy of reverence.  
 Surely this constitutional design was not accidental. The creation 
of constitutional culture in the new nation-state began from its revo-
lutionary roots but moved toward consolidation with its new constitu-
tional text, a strategic intent of the drafters who saw themselves as 
nation-builders faced with the daunting task of constructing a union 
from separate groups whose revolutionary conquest a few years ear-
lier had set in motion the march toward nationhood. In this respect, 
the brevity of the document served several related purposes. First, it 
invited Americans to get acquainted with their new charter and to 
learn it, as if they were preparing to recite its text as lines to a play. 
Second, it palliated fears about the overwhelming dominance of a 
new national government. Endowed as it was with limited powers, 
the authority of the central state was spelled out in detail but none-
theless succinctly in a document, and Americans could rest assured 
of the boundaries that constrained its actions—because those mar-
gins were documented on paper. Third, as a more practical matter, 
the brevity of the document has actually allowed it to survive, nearly 
unchanged in form, for over two hundred years.233
 228.  Richard D. Brown, The Ideal of the Written Constitution: A Political Legacy of the 
Revolution, in LEGACIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 85, 87 (Larry R. Gerlach, James A. 
Dolph & Michael L. Nicholls eds., 1978). 
 229.  CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 258 (1987). 
 230.  Joseph Story, The Science of Government, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF 
JOSEPH STORY 622 (William W. Story ed., 1852). 
 231.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY xi (2005). 
 232.  Douglas Litowitz, Legal Writing: Its Nature, Limits, and Dangers, 49 MERCER L.
REV. 709, 738 (1998). 
 233.  WALTER B. MEAD, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: PERSONALITIES, PRINCI-
PLES, AND ISSUES 166 (1987). 
412 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:373
 What Bobby Knight sees in the United States Constitution and 
the Ten Commandments is the merit of generality. Though there are 
incontrovertible facts of history that underlie each provision in each 
of those texts, both documents have survived as paragons of commu-
nity-building because they allow people to see in them what they 
want to see. They are written in sweeping terms that few can de-
scribe as undesirable. Where the one speaks of justice or another 
speaks of fairness, or one speaks of equality and the other speaks of 
love, no one can disagree with its principles at the high level of 
abstraction at which either document is cast. It would be like disa-
greeing with the goodness of ice cream and puppy dogs—it is unlikely 
because we can all imagine in our mind’s eye the type of ice cream we 
crave or the breed of dog we prefer.  
 All of which returns us to the merits of the United States Consti-
tution’s generality. That the document was written succinctly 
demonstrates that its drafters knew well enough to shape a docu-
ment that could accommodate future interpretation by citizens 
and officials alike.234 This may help explain why the United States 
Constitution commands such reverence from Americans. As James 
Bryce writes, “[i]t ranks above every other written Constitution for 
the intrinsic excellence of its scheme, its adaptation to the circum-
stances of the people, the simplicity, brevity, and precision of its 
language, its judicious mixture of definition in principle with elasticity 
in details.”235 As much as its shortness contributes to its generality, 
so does its silence on many subjects that the founders could have ad-
dressed, both of which together permit the Constitution to evolve in a 
way that usually does not produce jarring results disconnected from 
the text.236
 But some observers have difficulty saying the same about the 
NCAA Constitution. The results that flow from the Constitution 
sometimes defy its text, according to critics. Why, asks one commen-
tator, does the NCAA Constitution proclaim as its signpost the prin-
ciple of amateurism yet fall short, in practice, of doing what it should 
to ensure its integrity?237 Why, asks another, does the NCAA purport 
to place education at the summit of importance yet nonetheless treat 
 234.  Michael Kammen, “The Most Wonderful Instrument Ever Drawn by the Hand of 
Man”: Changing American Perceptions of Their Constitution, in THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION: ITS BIRTH, GROWTH, AND INFLUENCE IN ASIA 9 (J. Barton Starr ed., 1988). 
 235.  MARTIN J. WADE & WILLIAM F. RUSSELL, ELEMENTARY AMERICANISM: THE SHORT 
CONSTITUTION 78 (1920) (quoting JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (1888)). 
 236.  MICHAEL FOLEY & JOHN E. OWENS, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: INSTITU-
TIONAL POLITICS IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 13 (1996). 
 237.  See James Hopkins, NCAA Penalties: Corporate Accountability for Coaches and 
Presidents, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2003). 
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its competitors as athletes first and students second?238 In the com-
mercial context, another argues that the NCAA constitutional regime 
is “unconscionable” because it operates as an unreasonable restraint 
of trade on student-athletes.239 And, it has even become common to 
question whether the NCAA’s rules comport with the strictures of 
due process.240
 This bodes poorly for the NCAA Constitution. What makes it 
worse is that informed observers do not simply raise questions about 
whether the NCAA is acting honorably to fulfill its mission, as if it 
were an honest query with no discernible answer. Quite the contrary, 
scholars and stakeholders speak of the NCAA as “cling[ing] to a myth 
of ‘amateurism,’ ”241 failing to take the necessary initiative to improve 
the quality of life of student-athletes,242 “drift[ing] away from per-
forming a public function and towards promoting the interests of its 
representative member institutions,”243 letting the “commercializa-
tion of intercollegiate sports . . . mar[] the NCAA’s stated educational 
objectives,”244 and of betraying its alleged hypocrisy in “never tak[ing] 
seriously” its own stated principles.245
 One could not imagine perspectives more damning for the NCAA. 
Not only is the institution seen as acting contrary to its constitutional 
mission, but it is viewed as utterly unconcerned with the student-
athletes that compete in its intercollegiate sports. To be fair, I sus-
pect that the way the NCAA is perceived may not accurately reflect 
the reality of what its institutional officers and members really are, 
feel, and believe. It would be surprising to discover that the NCAA 
and its leaders were entirely disengaged from their mission to 
promote amateurism and to integrate intercollegiate sports into the 
woven life of a student-athlete. After all, the women and men who 
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staff the NCAA are undoubtedly well-intentioned citizens who toil to 
give students a lasting foundation of academic and athletic achieve-
ment that will help them go on to lead fulfilling and successful 
lives and to become active members of their respective communities. 
That, I am certain, is true. But true or not, the public perception is to 
the contrary.  
 And that, in turn, deflates the public value of the NCAA Constitu-
tion. Its principles mean less the more they are seen as mere window-
dressing for public consumption. And that appears to be the case to-
day inasmuch as the NCAA Constitution is more like a strict opera-
tions manual enumerating in excruciating detail when, how, and for 
what purpose its governors may act. No more stark contrast could 
exist between it and the United States Constitution, which is instead 
written as a higher-ordered blueprint and which betrays a judgment 
that its constituents made about their governors that it is harder to 
say about the NCAA’s constituents: the short United States Constitu-
tion “assume[d] great trust in those who will be governing under it” 
and presupposed “that government officials would be true to the spir-
it of the document.”246 It appears nothing short of a stretch to use the 
same language to describe how the NCAA’s constituents regard their 
own constitution. The consequence is devastating for the NCAA and 
its hope for creating a culture of respect for its Constitution, among 
its members and nonmembers alike. As long as the NCAA is not be-
lieved to be taking seriously its own stated constitutional mission, 
the NCAA Constitution will continue to be seen through the eyes of 
Bobby Knight. 
V. CONCLUSION
 From the arts, sports, trade, entertainment, politics, and war, 
constitutionalism compels and constrains all dimensions of our eve-
ryday lives. Constitutionalism informs how states behave in the in-
ternational order, how governments treat their constituents, how 
communities order themselves, how groups relate to individuals, and 
how citizens interact with each other. Is it possible to make meaning-
ful distinctions among this multiplicity of constitutions? That was the 
challenge that framed our inquiry—a difficult challenge that has 
proven even more difficult than imagined. Nonetheless, we have cov-
ered a lot of ground across the rough terrain that lay between us and 
our destination: to distill constitutionalism to its essence.  
 Our first step was to press the conventional distinction among in-
ternational, national, and local constitutions, and between public and 
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private constitutions. Our conclusion on both counts was the same: 
these distinctions are unsatisfactory. Defining constitutionalism ac-
cording to geography is unsatisfactory because, as we have seen, the 
distinction between an international and a national constitution is 
just as blurry as the line between a national and a local constitution. 
There is more continuity than divergence among international, na-
tional, and local constitutions because they are better viewed as fall-
ing along a hierarchy of constitutional authority. The local must de-
fer to the national, which must in turn conform to the international. 
Defining constitutionalism according to its sphere of application is 
equally unsatisfactory because the distinction between public and 
private no longer commands the force of reason it may once have. 
These two spheres are only superficially distinct; at their core, they 
are both constitutive of a single sphere where the private can no 
longer be described as antimodal to the public.  
 Our next step was to find an alternative way of classifying consti-
tutional types. Instead of conceptualizing constitutions according to 
their zone of application and territorial reach, I proposed to distin-
guish constitutions according to their constituent components. This 
led us to two categories of constitutions: constitutions that satisfy the 
basics of constitutionalism and those that exhibit the virtues of con-
stitutionalism. This taxonomy of constitutional basics and constitu-
tional virtues ultimately proved helpful to piercing our way through 
the veil that obscures constitutionalism and constitutional types.   
 But there remains further for us to travel. The taxonomy of consti-
tutional basics and constitutional types does not resolve the problem 
that continues to frustrate the challenge of defining constitutional-
ism: the crisis of constitutional cultification. States, subnational 
governments, associations, unions, groups, and corporations have 
deployed constitutionalism for purposes both good and evil. We can 
sometimes cut through the smokescreen of their stated constitutional 
mission to discern their real constitutional purpose. But that is a ter-
ribly complicated inquiry that pushes us well beyond the text of the 
constitution and pulls us into questions about how the constitution 
actually works and how it fits within the broader culture of the con-
stitutional community. It may be that a constitution is engaged in 
the steadfast pursuit of the lofty ideals that constitute civil society. 
Or it may be that a constitution is engaged in a dishonest project to 
conceal mal-intent. These enduring unknowns are part of what 
threaten to devolve what could otherwise be a promising culture of 
constitutionalism into a cult of constitutionalism defined more by 
artifice than virtue. 
 The challenge ahead is to move beyond the narrow inquiry of de-
fining constitutionalism. What is a constitution? It matters less the 
closer we get to cultifying constitutionalism because once we reach 
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that point—let us hope we are not yet there—the community-
building, democracy-enhancing, and participatory values to which 
constitutionalism should aspire, will be lost amid the shallow insin-
cerities that constitutions reflect for the sake of appearances alone. 
We should therefore give less attention to the form of a constitution 
and more scrutiny to its content. It should matter little, for instance, 
that a constitution proclaims the separation of powers as its corner-
stone if one authority-wielding institution has arrogated to itself 
all powers and divested the others of theirs. A constitutional text 
should likewise command minimal deference if it declares fidelity to 
a righteous mission yet discharges its institutional obligations in 
ways that betray contrary intentions. Our task is, therefore, to hold 
constitutions to account for the promises their makers pledge to their 
communities. Only then may we forestall our descent toward the 
cultification of constitutionalism and instead rise to keep our 
commitment to it. 
